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or the entire first half of this year, since the far-left, anti-austerity Syriza party 
came to power in January, the Greek saga virtually monopolised the attention of 
European policy-makers. Even as their country’s economy crashed, Greece’s 
new government remained adamant in demanding debt relief without austerity – that 
is, until mid-July, when they suddenly agreed to the creditors’ terms. Indeed, as of July 
13th, Greece’s staunchly anti-austerity government has been obliged to impose even 
tougher austerity and pursue painful structural reforms, under its creditors’ close 
supervision. 
Why did the Greek government concede to terms that not only controverted its own 
promises, but also closely resembled those that voters had overwhelmingly rejected in 
a popular referendum barely a week earlier? 
Many believe that Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras was responding to an 
ultimatum from his European partners: Accept our demands or leave the euro. The 
question is why a Greek exit from the euro (‘Grexit’) amounted to such a potent threat. 
In fact, from an economic perspective, Grexit no longer represents the potential 
catastrophe that it once did. After all, the main short-term cost – financial-system 
disruption – has already materialised in Greece: banks and the stock market have been 
shut down, and capital controls have been imposed. While those actions were needed 
to stem large-scale capital flight and prevent the banking system’s collapse, they also 
caused the Greek economy to contract sharply. 
In this context, Greek negotiators might have considered another proposal, circulated 
informally by the German finance ministry, recommending that Greece receive 
immediate debt forgiveness, in exchange for leaving the euro temporarily. If Greece 
remained in the euro, no relief would be granted – a proviso consistent with the 
German position that debt restructuring for eurozone countries would be illegal. 
While the legal argument is probably spurious, an outright debt reduction for a 
eurozone country remains politically impossible. 
The German proposal, spearheaded by Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, 
highlights the fundamental change that has occurred in Greece’s relationship with its 
F 
2 | DANIEL GROS 
 
European partners since its last bailout package three years ago. In 2012, Greece was 
offered hundreds of billions of euros in financial support, and its creditors, including 
Greek commercial banks, were pushed to accept substantial ‘voluntary’ haircuts. 
Tellingly, when George Papandreou, Greece’s prime minister at the time, proposed a 
referendum on the existing adjustment programme and his country’s continued 
eurozone membership in 2011, he was warned off in no uncertain terms by France’s 
then-President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Though 
Papandreou would have campaigned for the adjustment programme and the euro, a 
referendum was a risk that his European partners were unwilling to take. 
Tsipras’s government, by contrast, was able to hold its referendum, and even 
campaign against the creditors’ proposed adjustment programme (which, it should be 
noted, was no longer on the table). Even the resounding “no” delivered by Greek 
voters could not strengthen the government’s negotiating position, for a simple reason: 
Grexit is no longer considered a threat to the euro’s stability. That is why German 
officials – especially Schäuble – have been encouraging Greece to leave. 
One can only speculate about Schäuble’s motivation in pushing for Grexit. He seems 
to believe that a more integrated eurozone, although certainly desirable, is not feasible 
with a country that cannot be trusted to abide by the terms to which its government 
has agreed. 
Whatever Schäuble’s reasons, his proposal could have represented a way out for 
Greece, whose economy had been squeezed dry by austerity and whose banking 
system was already closed. Immediate debt reduction and the recovery of economic 
sovereignty – even at the expense of exiting the euro, at least temporarily – would seem 
to have offered significant long-term benefits. In a sense, it amounted to a golden 
opportunity, with Germany offering to pay for something that many believe Greece 
should be doing anyway. 
Nonetheless, the Greek government rejected an exit, and instead accepted the 
creditors’ tough terms. This suggests that, during the negotiations, Greece’s leaders 
were driven by more than economics. Perhaps, contrary to popular belief, countries’ 
political attachment to Europe via the euro remains very strong, even where, as in 
Greece, people have endured unprecedented hardship since joining the monetary 
union. 
The monetary union’s rationale, as many have noted, was always more political than 
economic. For precisely that reason, it may well be too early to write off the single 
currency. 
 
 
 
